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2. Waterbottom Issues - I. Titles
Newman Trowbridge, Jr.
Attorney at Law
Lafayette, Louisiana
I. Introduction
Upon Louisiana's admission to the Union in 1812, the United States
owned all land within the state, except that which was the subject of a
valid grant by a prior sovereign. The United States, therefore, is the au-
thor of the vast majority of titles in Louisiana. Severance of land from
the public domain of the United States occurred either by 1) reservations
to the state, 2) direct grants by the United States to the state or 3) grants
by the United States to the private sector. Irrespective of the method by
which land is severed from the public domain of the United States, when
waterbottoms appear on the severed tract, title issues can occur. In Part I
of this presentation, we will identify and discuss some of the circum-
stances giving ri 3e to these title issues.
II. Survey and Resurvey of Public Lands
Before pub'.ic lands could be disposed of by the United States they
had to first be kentified and subdivided. To perform this task, Congress
created a Land Department, which included a General Land Office and
district land offices. Since 1946, jurisdiction over public lands has vested
in the Department of Interior, Bureau of Land Management.'
The method by which public lands are identified is survey. By the
Ordinance of 1785, Congress established a rectangular system for sur-
veying lands. The rules of survey generally adopted by Congress in the
Ordinance of 1735 are presently codified at 43 U.S.C. § 751. The rectan-
gular survey system is based upon the establishment of a principal merid-
ian, running north-south, and an intersecting base line, running east-west
and thereafter monumenting additional east-west lines at six mile inter-
vals. These east-west lines are called "township" lines. Additional north
south lines are then monumented from the base line, also at six mile in-
tervals, which are called "range" lines. Each of the resulting six mile
squares can be ic entified by reference to its position relative to township
and range lines. Thus, the six mile square positioned between the base
line and the first township line north of the base line and between the
principal meridian and the first range line east of the principal meridian
is uniquely identifiable as Township 1 North, Range 1 East.2
Each township is further divided by running lines in a north-south
direction and east-west direction at one mile intervals and monumented
43 U.S.C. §1.
2 See Estopinal, Understanding Land Surveys, pp. 83-106 (1989); 43 U.S.C. §751.
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every half mile. Each resulting one mile square is called a "section" and
identified by a number. In a perfect world, each ideal six mile square will
consist of 36 one mile square, or 640 acre, sections numbered I through
36. However, without fear of contradiction, it can be said that few, if any,
of the sections surveyed by the General Land Office (GLO) are actually
one mile squares due to many factors, including imprecise measurement.
Exceptions to the general rules of surveying cause even greater diver-
gence from the ideal. The presence of water is responsible for some of
these exceptions. For instance, surveyors were instructed to survey river
lots as radiating sections along navigable water bodies before dividing
and surveying townships into square sections. Certain townships in
which navigable rivers and streams are located consist of as many as 125
sections.' The presence of navigable waters created another exception to
the general rules of surveying in that the surveyor was instructed to "me-
ander" the water course, surveying as much of the area as possible. 43
U.S.C. §751.4 The practice of meandering navigable waters, as will be
discussed later, is of significant importance in determining title in Lou-
isiana.
Patents of land along meandered water bodies generally convey title
to the shore of the water body; however, where the meander line is some
distance from the actual shore, it has been held that the patent conveys
only to the meander line.' The fact that a water body has been meandered
does not establish its navigability; however, the meander is strong evi-
dence of navigability and may make the water body prima facie naviga-
ble.'
In the context of title, it is imperative to remember that government
surveys do not ascertain boundaries, they create them.7 As a rule, trans-
fers from the United States convey title only to that land which has been
surveyed.
Generally, whether or not the original GLO survey is correct, only
the federal government can require a resurvey. The courts have no juris-
3 See Madson, Louisiana Real Property Boundary Law, p. 627 (1983).
4 See also Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 11 S.Ct. 808, 35 L.Ed. 428 (1891).
See Acadia-Vermilion Rice Irrigating Co. v. Miller, 152 So. 576, 178 La. 954 (La.
1933).
6 See McDade v.Bossier Levee Board, 33 So. 628, 109 La. 625 (La. 1902); Louisiana
Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 51 So. 708 (1910); Brewer Elliott Oil & Gas Co.
v. United States, 2 6 0 U.S. 77, 4 3 S. Ct . 60, 67 L . Ed . 14 0 (1922).
Home v. Smith, 159 U.S. 40, 15 S.Ct. 988, 40 L.Ed. 68 (1895); Union Producing
Co. v. Placid Oil Company, 178 So.2d 392 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1965), cert. den. 179 So.2d
432 (La. 1965), cert. den. 385 U.S. 843, 87. S.Ct. 31, 17 L.Ed. 75.
8 Cox v. Hart, 260 U.S. 427, 43 S.Ct. 154, 67 L.Ed. 332 (1922); State v. Aucoin, 20
So.2d 136 (La. 1945).
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diction in the matter.' Resurveys are limited to re-establishing the lines
originally surveyed. o However, when lands are erroneously omitted
from the GLO survey as being water, the United States may have the
omitted land suiveyed and dispose of it."
III. Lands Omiaed from Surveys as Water
As a general rule, when the United States patents land according to
an official plat or survey which shows the patented land bordering on a
body of water, patentee acquires to the water itself as opposed to the me-
ander line." These and numerous other cases, both state and federal, uni-
formly establish that meander lines along navigable bodies of water are
not intended to act as a boundary but are merely to show the sinuosities
of the body of water and ascertain the quantity of land in the fractional
section."
As with any rule, there are exceptions. The exceptions to the general
rule in the case of omitted lands prevents its application in circumstances
in which i) the facts show conclusively that no body of water exists at or
near the place indicated on the plat of survey; ii) the facts establish that
there never was an attempt to survey the land in controversy; or iii) the
facts establish that there has been such gross and palpable error as to
constitute in effect a fraud upon the government.'" Whether the general
rule or the exceptions apply to a particular case constitutes an issue of
fact to be determined by the trial court based upon the evidence pre-
sented."
In almost every instance, modern courts have considered this factual
determination in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
9 State v. Aucoin, supra; Richard v. Poitevent and Favre Lumber Company, 11
La.App. 496, 120 S,. 235 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1929).
'o Sullivan v. Ne v Orleans and NE.R. Co., 9 La.App. 162, 119 So. 275 (La.App. 1st
Cir. 1928).
" Jeems Bayou Hunting and Fishing Club v. U.S., 274 F. 18 (5th Cir. 1921), affr. 260
U.S. 561, 43 S.Ct. 205, 67 L.Ed. 402 (1922). See also Savage v. Packard 218 La. 637, 50
So.2d 298 (1951).
12 Oren v. Smith, 159 U.S. 40, 15 S.Ct. 988, 40 L.Ed. 68 (1895); United States v.
Zager, 338 F.Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis. 1972); International Improvement Fund of the State
of Florida v. Nowak, 401 F.2d 708 (5th Cir. 1968).
13 State v. Aucoir, 206 La. 787, 20 So.2d 136 (La. 1944); RD Fornea Co. Inc. v. For-
nea, 324 So.2d 619 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1975), writ denied, 326 So.2d 374 (1976); Stamper
v. Bienville Parish Police Jury, 153 So.2d 503 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1963); Lafourche Basin
Levee District v. Ralhborne Land Company Inc., 868 So.2d 928 (La.App. 5th Cir. 2004),
writ denied 872 So.3d 1088 (La. 2004).
14 United States ). Lane, 260 U.S. 662, 43 S.Ct. 236, 267 L.Ed. 448 (1923); Jeems
Bayou Fishing & Hanting Club v. United States, supra; United States v. Zager, supra;
Lafourche Basin Levre District v. Rathborne, supra.
'5 Albrecht v. United States, 831 F.2d. 196, 199 (10th Cir. 1987); International Im-
provement Fund of the State ofFlorida v. Nowak, 401 F.2d 708, 718 (5th Cir. 1968).
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United States v. Lane, supra, and in Jeems Bayou Fishing & Hunting
Club v. United States, supra. Both of these cases were decided on the
same day and both involve the same 1839 survey and 1916 resurvey of
land bordering on Ferry Lake in Caddo Parish. The Court reached con-
trary conclusions, however, as to the application of the general rule based
on its consideration of the facts in each case. In Lane, the general rule
was applied while in Jeems Bayou, the gross error exception was found
applicable. In each of these 1923 cases, the United States Supreme Court,
while recognizing that the quantity of the omitted land in proportion to
the total quantity of lands surveyed is the primary consideration deter-
mining whether to apply the general rule or the exceptions, concluded
that the character, nature and value of the omitted land at the time of the
original survey are also factors to be considered in determining if the
failure of the surveyor to run lines with more particularity constitutes
gross error.
In Lane, the Court was concerned with six tracts and omitted lands
ranging in size from 5.67 acres to 97.64 acres constituting an area of
about 4,000 feet in length and 12,000 feet in width. The proportional
omission ranged from 10% to about 21%. In applying the general rule,
the Court concluded that the establishment of a line coincident with the
water's edge would have been a matter of expense and difficulty dispro-
portionate to the value of the omitted land and, therefore, the omission
was not unreasonable. To the contrary, in Jeems Bayou, the omitted lands
constituted more than 500 acres and were well timbered with a growth of
pine, oak and other trees. The proportional omission in that case was al-
most double the size of the original tract, an incremental increase of
175%. On these facts, the Court concluded that the omission was either
deliberate or the result of gross and palpable error. An excellent discus-
sion and comparison of Lane, Jeems Bayou, as well as a significant sam-
pling of cases that followed, appears in United States v. 295.90 Acres of
Land," in which the court refused to apply the gross error exception to
an area added by the new survey which resulted in an incremental in-
crease of 21%.
More recently, the general rule rather than the exception was ap-
plied with respect to a resurvey of lands located in the vicinity of Lake
des Allemands." Rathborne involved an original 1832 survey and a re-
survey of the entirety of the township in 1857, 1858 and 1859 suggesting
that one of the sections at issue was larger by 44.5 acres than on the
original survey and another larger by 391.67 acres. Both sections were
conveyed into the private sector prior to the resurvey. After initially re-
fusing to do so, in 1923 the United States conveyed the alleged omitted
16 368 F.Supp. 1301 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
" Lafourche Basin Levee District v. Rathborne Land Company Inc., 868 So.2d 928
(La.App. 5th Cir. 2004), writ denied 872 So.3d 1088 (La. 2004).
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lands to the Stite of Louisiana by patent and described the lands con-
veyed as being those "lying between the meanders of Lake des Alle-
mands as shown on the plat approved July 9, 1832 and the meanders of
that lake as shown on plat approved September 26, 1859." In 1951, the
state transferred that property to the Lafourche Basin Levee District. In
1999, the Leveo District instituted proceedings against Rathborne assert-
ing its ownership of the lands allegedly acquired from the state in 1951.
The issues raised in Rathborne were 1) was the land appearing on
the 1859 survey omitted land or new land and 2) if omitted land, did the
omission constitute such gross error as to fall within the exception to the
general rule? Ihe trial court concluded that the land was omitted, not
new, and that the general rule rather than the gross error exception was
applicable. Accordingly, Rathborne's title was decreed to extend to the
water's edge not to the 1832 meander. In reaching its conclusion, the
court observed that the original survey totaled 13,492.56 acres and the
resurvey indicated 17,571.01 acres. The omitted land totaling 4,078.45
acres or 23.21% of the total did not, in the court's opinion, rise to the
level of gross eiror in view of the value of the land omitted, the wild and
remote character of the land and the attendant difficulty in surveying
same.
There has not been unanimity among the courts as to the methodol-
ogy to be employed in calculating the proportional omission. One
method, which now appears to be the preferred method, is to divide the
omitted area by the sum of the omitted area and the area originally sur-
veyed." Other courts have made the comparison based on the area in
controversy, while others have utilized the entire area surveyed and still
others have examined the issue on a patent by patent basis. In Rathborne,
supra, even though only two sections in the township were at issue, the
trial court chose to calculate the proportional omission by comparing the
total acres appearing on the original survey (13,492.56 acres) to the acre-
age platted on the resurvey (17,517.01 acres) and concluded the propor-
tional omission of 23.21% did not constitute gross error. The court of
appeal agreed with the trial court's rationale and the affirmed the ruling.
The reluctance of courts to apply the exceptions rather than the gen-
eral rule appears to be grounded in substantial part in significant policy
considerations which weigh heavily against the application of the excep-
tion. Thus, in Mtchell v. Smale," the United States Supreme Court found
that the application of the exception would be "nothing more or less than
taking from the first grantee a most valuable, and often most valuable,
1 See United St2tes v. Zager, supra; Lafourche Basin Levee District v. Rathborne,
supra.
1 140 U.S. 406, 11 S.Ct. 819, 35 L.Ed. 442 (1891).
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part of his grant."20 Subsequently, in Wright v. Blodgett Co. v. United
States,2 1 the Court reiterated that century old surveys are bound to be in-
accurate in some respects and "....the immense importance of stability of
titles dependent upon [government patents] demand that suits to cancel
them should be sustained only by proof which produces conviction."
The gross error exception is not to be confused with the exception
preventing application of the general rule in situations in which there is,
in fact, the absence of a water body in the vicinity of that indicated on the
original survey. Even though many of these cases appear to base the re-
sult on the gross error exception, close reading of the case will reveal the
absence of a body of water within the vicinity of the surveyed lands.22
IV. Sovereignty Lands
As indicated previously, one of the methods by which land is trans-
ferred out of the United States is by reservation to the state in which that
land is located. Under the equal footing or public trust doctrine, new
states are admitted to the Union on an "equal footing" with the original
13 Colonies and succeed to the United States' title to the beds of naviga-
ble water and tide waters to the high-water mark.23 Attempts by the
United States to convey title to these lands have been consistently held to
be null, void and of no effect, except in extremely limited circum-
stances. 24 Thus, Louisiana, upon its admission to the Union, acquired, by
virtue of its inherent sovereignty, ownership of all navigable waters, and
the soils beneath same, to the high-water mark, together with ownership
of the soils beneath water subject to the ebb and flow of the tide to the
high-water mark.2 s
The concept of navigability, therefore, is critical to identification of
which waterbottoms were received by the State of Louisiana upon ad-
mission to the Union as sovereignty lands. In Louisiana, a body of water
is considered navigable only in those instances in which it is found to be
susceptible of being used as a highway of commerce in the customary
20 140 U.S. at 412.
21 236 U.S. 397, 403, 35 S.Ct. 339, 341, 59 L.Ed. 637 (1915).
22 French-Glenn Livestock Company v. Springer, 185 U.S. 47, 22 S.Ct. 563, 46 L.Ed.
800 (1902); Lee Wilson & Company v. United States, 245 U.S. 24, 38 S.Ct. 21, 62 L.Ed.
128 (1917); and Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 175 U.S. 300, 20 S.Ct. 124, 44 L.Ed. 171
(1891).
23 Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 228-229, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845); United
States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5, 117 S.Ct. 1888, 138 L.Ed. 2d 231 (1997).
24 Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 56 S.Ct. 23, 80 L.Ed 9
(1935); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 108 S.Ct. 791, 794, and 98
L.Ed. 2d 877 (1988); United States v. Alaska, 545 U.S. 75, 125 S.Ct. 2137, 162 L.Ed. 2d
57 (2005).
25 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894); Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. Mississippi, supra.
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mode of trade End travel in the area." Therefore, the mere fact that water
is deep enough and wide enough for use by a pirogue or a flat-bottom
fishing boat does not establish navigability."
Determination of navigability for title purposes may also have a
time componer t. Navigability to establish state ownership by virtue of
inherent sovereignty is determined as of the date of Louisiana's admis-
sion to the Union." On the other hand, navigability to determine aliena-
bility from the state to the private sector is determined as of the date of
severance from Louisiana." Thus, title issues may arise when a body of
water that was navigable as of Louisiana's admission to the Union in
1812 becomes non-navigable subsequently or in situations in which an
area that was previously non-navigable subsequently becomes navigable.
Article 450 of the Civil Code declares that "the waters and bottoms of
natural navigable water bodies" are public things. While a literal inter-
pretation of Aricle 450 can lead to the conclusion that a body of water
which was non-navigable in 1812 but subsequently becomes navigable is
a public thing, Louisiana courts appear to limit state ownership to beds
and bottoms of those waters determined to be navigable as of the later of
Louisiana's admission to the Union or severance of the land through
which the water body courses from the state. 30 Moreover, it has been sug-
gested by at least one influential commentator that an interpretation of
Article 450 that vests the state with ownership of the soils beneath waters
which were nor.-navigable at the later of admission to the Union or sev-
erance may give rise to questions of constitutionality under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and pursuant
to Article 1, Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution."
In this context, Civil Code Article 506 must be considered as well.
That Article wa3 added in 1979 as a new provision to the Civil Code and
declares that, in the absence of title or prescription, the beds of non-
navigable rivers or streams belong to the riparian owners to the thread of
the stream.
26 Burns v. Creecent Gun and Rod Club, 116 La. 1038, 41 So. 249 (1906); State v.
Aucoin, 206 La. 78", 20 So.2d 136 (1944); Discon v. Saray, Inc., 262 La. 997, 265 So.2d
765 (1972).
27 John v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 303 So.2d 779, 785, 90 (La.App. 3rd
Cir. 1974); Kieff v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Company, 779 So.2d 85 (La.App.
4th Cir. 2001).
28 State v. Jeffergon Island Salt Mining Co., 183 La. 304, 163 So. 145 (1935); Dardar
v. LaFourche Realt, 985 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1993).
29 Vermilion Bay Land Company v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 646 So.2d 408
(La.App. 4th Cir. 1994), writ denied 650 So.2d 1176 (La. 1995).
30 Dardar v. Lafourche Realty, supra; Vermilion Bay Land Company v. Phillips Pe-
troleum Company, supra.
31 See Yiannopoulos, 2 La. Civ. L. Treatise, Property, §63 (4th ed.).
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The State Land Office has responsibility for making navigability
determinations on which the state bases its claims of ownership to water-
bottoms for 11 purposes. The "unofficial" guidelines applied by the State
Land Office for these purposes include the following:
a. One chain or 100 links (66 feet). is generally the minimum
width for a waterway to be considered navigable.
b. .The waterway must be illustrated on a township plat as being
meandered or shown with a double line. However, not all double
lined waterways shown on the township plat have a width in excess
of I chain. State Land Office guidelines require use of the associ-
ated field notes to confirm the width of the river or stream. The wa-
terway shown by a single line may be considered navigable, if the
associated field notes confirm that the width is greater than 1 chain.
Exceptions to the foregoing occur if it can be shown that the sur-
veyor omitted a waterway by error or if the section lines were not
established on the ground during the original survey.
c. The waterway must be either connected to a navigable water-
way or be in close proximity to it. The waterway in question may
not be completely landlocked.
d. If a river or stream completely dries up, the state loses its own-
ership to the riparian landowner. For the state to retain ownership,
water must flow through the waterway at least part of the year. The
length of time for the required flow has not been determined. Wa-
terways which carry water only during flood stage are not consid-
ered navigable.
e. Waterways are generally considered as potentially navigable
only if 'they are named on either the township plat or the field notes.
A named waterway is not assumed to be navigable, but naming of
the waterway is a general prerequisite for a determination of navi-
gability. Exceptions occur if it can be shown that the surveyor omit-
ted a waterway by error or if the original survey did not establish the
section lines on the ground.
f. If sections lines were not established on the grounds during the
original survey, the State Land Office utilizes the 1930s editions of
the USGS Quadrangle Map and applies the foregoing guidelines.
If requested, the State Land Office will now provide a plat of an
area in question on which it will identify those waterbottoms presently
claimed by the state. The plat is accompanied by a letter from the State
Land Office indicating that the plat represents only an estimate of the
state's claims. In considering these guidelines and determinations by the
State Land Office, it must be kept in mind that these are state guidelines
applied by state employees to determine the extent of state claims of
ownership. Both the guidelines and their application are often challenged
-36-
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by private claimants. This is particularly true of the guideline requiring
utilization of th: 1930s editions of U.S.G.S. Quadrangle Map in circum-
stances in whici section lines were not established on the ground by the
original GLO survey. In many instances, private claimants assert the ex-
istence of other maps, such as Civil War era military maps, that provide
better evidence of navigability during time periods that are much more
relevant than the 1930s. Navigability is never presumed and the burden
of proof always lies with the party seeking to establish navigability.
V. Disposition of Sovereignty Lands
One of the more fertile grounds for debate and litigation has been
the extent to which Louisiana is obligated to maintain ownership of sov-
ereignty lands and the extent to which the state has, in fact, divested it-
self of sovereigity lands. Historically, beds or bottoms of navigable wa-
ter bodies have been considered public things, inalienable by the state
and insusceptible of private ownership. Originally based on interpreta-
tions of Article 449, 450 and 453 of the Civil Code of 1870, the legisla-
ture first directly prohibited alienation of state-owned waterbottoms by
Act 106 of 1886. That Act, however, pertains only to waters adjoining
the Gulf of MeN ico and declared that same were publicly owned and that
public ownership should be maintained. By its express terms, Act 106 of
1886 exempted the beds of all such navigable waters that had been "here-
tofore sold or conveyed by special grants or by sale by this State, or by
the United States to any private party or parties." The first direct declara-
tion of inalienability applicable to the beds of all navigable waters ap-
pears in Article 4, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, which
prohibited the legislature from alienating "the bed of any navigable
stream, lake or body of water, except for purposes of reclamation." In the
1974 Constitution, the proscription was revised to prohibit the "alien-
ation of the bed of a navigable water body, except for purposes of recla-
mation by the riparian owner to recover land lost through erosion.""
Prior to 1921, the State of Louisiana had issued a significant number
of patents which, for one reason or another, failed to except beds of
navigable water; from the area conveyed. By Act 62 of 1912, now R.S.
9:5661, the Louisiana legislature enacted a six year prescriptive limit on
suits to annul patents. In a number of subsequent decisions, Louisiana
courts held that patents of areas including navigable waters, which did
not reserve title to those waters to the state, are valid and no longer as-
sailable.34 In reaction to these decisions, the legislature adopted Act 727
32 Burns v. Crescent Gun and Rod Club, supra; McCluskey v. Mereaux and Nunez,
Inc., 186 So. 117 (La. 1939); State v. Two O'Clock Bayou Land Company, 365 So.2d
1174 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1978), writ refused 367 So.2d 387 (La. 1979).
3 1974 Constitution, Article IX, Sec. 3.
3 See Californic Co. v. Price, 225 La. 706, 74 So.2d 1 (1954); Humble Oil and Refin-
ing Co. v. State Mineral Board, 223 La. 47, 64 So.2d 839 (1953).
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of 1954, which act states its purpose to be the reaffirmation of the public
policy of Louisiana that navigable waters and beds thereof are insuscep-
tible of private ownership. That Act specifically declares that it was not
the intention of Act 62 of 1912 to authorize the alienation or transfer of
navigable waters or their beds. Acts 1954, No. 727, now R.S. 9:1107 et
seq. Section 3 of Act 727 provides that "No statute enacted by the legis-
lature of Louisiana shall be construed as to validate by reason of pre-
scription or peremption any patent or transfer issued by the state or any
levee district thereof, so far as the same purports to include navigable or
tidal waters or the beds of same."
In Gulf Oil Corporation v. State Mineral Boards3 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court overruled its earlier decisions in Humble Oil & Refining Co.
v. State Mineral Board and California Co. v. Price and held that attempts
by the state to convey title to navigable waterbottoms were null and void.
The Court in Gulf engages in a rather extensive discussion of public trust
doctrine and, among others, cites Illinois Central Railroad Company v.
Illinois," for the proposition that a state cannot abrogate the public trust
with which the lands it has received by virtue of its inherent sovereignty
are impressed.
By Act 645 of 1978 the Louisiana legislature declared the "beds and
bottoms of all navigable waters and the banks or shores of bays, arms of
the sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and navigable lakes belong to the state of
Louisiana, and the policy of this state is hereby declared to be that these
lands and water bottoms, hereinafter referred to as "public lands," shall
be protected, administered and conserved to best ensure full public navi-
gation, fishery, recreation, and other interests."" That statute places the
management of waterbottoms under the Department of Natural Re-
sources. By Act 876 of 1985, the legislature enacted R.S. 41:14 which
provides that "no grant, sale or conveyance of the lands forming the bot-
toms of rivers, streams, bayous, lagoons, lakes, bays, sounds and inlets
bordering on or connecting with the Gulf of Mexico within the territory
or jurisdiction of the state shall be made by the secretary of the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources or by any other official or by any subordinate
political subdivision, except pursuant to R.S. 41:1701 - 1714." That stat-
ute goes on to provide that rights accorded to owners or occupants of
lands on the shores of any waters described therein shall not extend be-
yond the ordinary low-water mark. These statutes, without question, ex-
press the strong policy of the state regarding the inalienability of naviga-
ble waters above the low-water mark.
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court revisited the public trust
3 317 So.2d 576 (La. 1974).
36 146 U.S. 387, 13 S.Ct. I10, 36 L.Ed. 1018 (1892).
3 R.S. 41:170 1.
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doctrine in Phillips Petroleum Company v. Mississippi, supra, and con-
cluded that individual states have the authority to define the limits of
their own public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as
they see fit. 108 S.Ct. at 794. Thus, Phillips appears to directly contradict
the Louisiana Supreme Court's suggestion in Gulf that Illinois Central
stands for the proposition that sovereignty lands are impressed with a
federal public trust which the states cannot abrogate. To the contrary,
Phillips, and its progeny, teach that Illinois Central should be viewed as
nothing more than the application by a federal court of state law and that
the federal public trust is spent upon the state's admission to the Union.
108 S. Ct. at 79. As stated by the Court in Phillips:
Because we believe that our cases firmly establish that the States,
upon entering the Union, were given ownership over all lands be-
neath water subject to the tide's influence, we affirm the Mississippi
Supreme Court's determination that the lands at issue here became
property of the State upon its admission to the Union in 1817. Fur-
thermore, because we find no reason to set aside the lower court's
state-law dtermination that subsequent developments did not divest
the State of its ownership of these public trust lands, the judgment
below is affirmed.
... And as for the effect of our decision today in other States, we
are doubtful that this ruling will do more than confirm the prevailing
understand: ng - which in some States is the same as Mississippi's,
and in others, is quite different. As this Court wrote in Shivley v.
Bbowlby, 152 U.S., at 26, "There is no universal and uniform law
upon the subject; but . . . each State has dealt with the lands under
the tide wa:ers within its borders according to its own views of jus-
tice and policy."
... We see, no reason to disturb the "general proposition[that] the
law of real property is, under our Constitution, left to the individual
States to develop and administer.""
In Delacrcix Corporation v. O'Brien,39 a case involving Lake
Quatro Caballo:.n Plaquemines Parish, the state urged Phillips as a basis
for a state claim to ownership of the lake. The court found, as a matter of
fact, that the lake was not subject to the ebb and flow of the tide in 1812
and that it was, therefore, unnecessary to discuss Phillips. The court,
3 484 U.S. at 482 - 484. See also Pollard's Lessee v. Hagen, 44 U.S. 212, 11 L.Ed.
565 (1845); United States v. Cres, 243 U.S. 316, 37 S.Ct. 380 (1917); Barney v. Keokuk,
94 U.S. 324, 24 L.Ed. 224 (1877); and Applebee v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 46
S.Ct. 569, 70 L.Ed. 992 (1926).
3 597 So.2d 65 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1992), writ denied 604 So.2d 1303 (La. 1992).
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nonetheless, apparently felt compelled to comment that Act 62 of 1912
would render unnecessary the production of expert testimony to deter-
mine the extent of ebb and flow of the tide in 1812 to determine the ex-
tent of the state's ownership. The denial of writs by the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in Delacroix may suggest the re-emergence of Act 62 of
1912 as a major factor in the resolution of waterbottom disputes between
the state and private claimants involving pre-1921 patents.
Clearly, Louisiana has exercised its legislative prerogative to reclas-
sify and relinquish the public trust as to multiple types of lands received
by it as sovereignty lands upon admission. For instance, Louisiana law
has consistently recognized banks of streams and rivers, the area between
ordinary low and ordinary high-water, as private things, subject to a lim-
ited right of public use.' Accordingly, while Louisiana clearly received
title to the high-water limits of rivers and streams as sovereignty lands
upon its admission to the Union, it has without question relinquished title
to those lands lying above ordinary low-water.
Similarly, notwithstanding the commonly understood fact that tides
in Louisiana reach their highest levels during the summer season, sea-
shore, as defined by Article 451 of the Civil Code, is limited to the high-
water mark in the winter. Louisiana courts have refused to interpret the
article in a manner other than it is written.' Moreover, Louisiana courts
have consistently interpreted Civil Code Article 451 as limiting seashore
to the area that is directly overflowed by the tides.42 Again, although
Louisiana clearly acquired all lands subject to the direct and indirect ebb
flow of the tide as sovereignty land upon its admission to the Union, it
has relinquished that title as to all lands lying above high tide in the win-
ter and all lands lying beneath tide waters that are not subject to direct
coastal ebb and flow.
By Act 998 of 1992, now R.S. 9:1115.1 et seq, the Louisiana legis-
lature addressed the issues raised in Phillips and distinguished the results
of that case under Mississippi law from the results which would obtain
by application of that decision in Louisiana. By virtue of that Act, Lou-
isiana law now expressly 1) declares that lands subject to tidal influence,
which are neither navigable waters, sea nor seashore, and which have
40 C.C. arts . 446, 448 (1825); C.C. arts. 455, 457 (1870); and C.C. art. 456 (1978).
See also State v. Richardson, 140 La. 329, 72 So. 984 (1916); State v. Bayou Johnson
Oyster Company, 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405, 409 (La. 1912); and Buckskin Hunting Club.
v. Bayard, 868 So.2d 266 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 2004).
41 Roy v. Board of Commissioners, 238 La. 926, 117 So:2d 60 (1960) (rejecting the
levee district's argument that seashore should be understood to refer to that land which is
"normally covered by the highest tides of the year.")
42 Morgan v. Negodich, 40 La.Ann. 246, 3 So. 636 (La. 1888); Roy v. Board of Com-
missioners, 238 La. 926, 117 So.60 (La. 1960); Dardar v. Lafourche Realty Co. Inc.,
supra.
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been alienated in accordance with laws in existence at the time of the
alienation are valid transfers by the state (R.S. 9:1115.1); 2) defines
inland non-navigEble water bodies as those which are not navigable in
fact and which arm not sea, arms of the sea, or seashore (R.S. 9:1115.2);
3) declares inland non-navigable water beds or bottoms to be private
things subject to private ownership (R.S. 9:1115.2); and 4) states that
transfers by the state encompassing inland non-navigable water beds or
bottoms within the boundaries of the property transferred, are presumed
to convey the ownership of the inland non-navigable waterbottoms,
unless title to the water body has been expressly reserved by the state in
the act. of transfer (R.S. 9:1115.3). The definitive statements by the Court
in Phillips combined with Act 998 of 1992 appear to put to rest any no-
tion that ownershp issues with respect to sovereignty lands are to be de-
termined by reference to any body of law other than those of Louisiana.
VI. School Lands
In 1785, the Continental Congress set aside sixteenth section lands
for the exclusive use of public education." Upon acquisition of the Lou-
isiana Territory by the United States in 1803, the reservation of sixteenth
section lands attached. On April 21, 1806, Congress authorized the
President of the 'United States to sell lands within the Louisiana Terri-
tory, subject to a reservation of sixteenth section lands for public educa-
tion purposes, specifically stating that the sixteenth section "shall be re-
served in each township for the support of schools within the same." 45 On
March 3, 1811, Congress again authorized the President of the United
States to sell lancs within the Louisiana Territory, again subject to a res-
ervation of sixteenth section lands for public education purposes." The
several statutes adopted by Congress relating to the reservation of six-
teenth section lands generally vest title in the state upon completion of
the survey of the township in which the section is located. A formal con-
veyance of school lands to the state is neither necessary nor customary.4 7
43 For analysis, and sometimes varying views, of the implications of Phillips in Lou-
isiana see Yiannopoulos, Five Babes Lost In The Tide - A Saga Of Land Titles In Two
States: Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 62 Tul.L.Rev. 1357 (1988); Louisiana State
Law Institute, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi; Advisory Opinion Relative to Non-
Navigable Water Bcttoms, 53 La.L.Rev. 36 (1992); Trowbridge, Waterbottoms After
Phillips Petroleum Company v. Mississippi, 39 Inst. on Min. Law 151 (1999); Wilkins
and Wascom, The Public Trust Doctrine in Louisiana, 52 La. L.Rev. 861 (1992); and
Hargrave, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Plea For Precision, 53 La.L.Rev. 1535 (1993).
4 1 Stat. 563.
4 2 Stat. 391.
46 2 Stat. 662.
47 2 Stat. 324 (1805). An excellent discussion of the history of the reservation of six-
teenth section lands For public education purposes see State of Louisiana ex rel. Plaque-
mines Parish School Board v. Plaquemines Parish. Government, 652 So.2d 1, 3 (La.App.
4th Cir. 1994); writ denied, 656 So.2d. 1015 (La. 1995), on remand, State of Louisiana
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In those situations in which the United States has previously dis-
posed of the school land, or the school land did not vest in the United
States, or the township contained no sixteenth section, the state is granted
statutory authority to select "indemnity" or "in-lieu" land." A selection
of indemnity lands must be certified to and approved by the Secretary of
the Interior. Despite the fact that the reservation of sixteenth sections is
referred to as a trust, a long line of jurisprudence makes clear that the
grant is absolute and not conditional.49
In the context of this presentation, the reservation of sixteenth sec-
tions to the state raises an issue only in those circumstances in which the
sixteenth section consists, in whole or in part, of lands which were beds
of navigable waters or soils underlying water subject to the ebb and flow
of the tide as of the date of Louisiana's admission to the Union. The is-
sue there, of course, is whether the sixteenth section is reserved to the
state as sovereignty lands or as school lands. That issue has apparently
now been resolved and in circumstances in which the sixteenth section
constitutes a bed of a navigable water or soil underlying water subject to
the ebb and flow of the tide, the sixteenth section is reserved to the state
as sovereignty lands and is not impressed with the school trust."o
VII. Swamp Land Grants
Prior to 1849, Louisiana had made a considerable investment in the
construction of levees along the Mississippi River. In an effort to aid
Louisiana in constructing levees and reclaiming swampland, Congress
adopted the Act of March 2, 1849 (9 Stat. 352) and Act of September 28,
1850 (9 Stat. 519) familiarly known as the Swamp Land Grants.5
Procedurally, the Swamp Land Grants allowed the state to identify
and select swamp and overflowed lands and once the selection was ap-
proved by the Secretary of Interior, title passed to the state. Irrespective
of the date on which the state selects and the Secretary of Interior ap-
proves the selection, the state's title relates back to the effective date of
the granting statute.
ex. relPlaquemines Parish School Board v. Plaquemines Parish Government, 690 So.2d
232 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1997), writ denied, 693 So.2d 768 (La. 1997).
48 43 U.S.C. §851.
49 Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 34 S.Ct. 301, 58 L. Ed. 555 (1914); State of
Louisiana v. William T. Joyce Co., 261 F. 128 (1919) cert. denied 253 U.S. 484, 40 S.Ct.
481, 64 L.Ed. 224 (1920).
so State of Louisiana ex rel. Plaquemines Parish School Board v. Plaquemines Parish
Government, supra; State v. Bayou Johnson Oyster Co., 130 La. 604, 58 So. 405, 409
(La. 1912).
5 For an excellent discussion of the history leading to the enactment of the Swamp
Land Grants, see Madden, Federal and State Lands in Louisiana, 260 et seq (1973).
52 United States v. O'Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 58 S.Ct. 708, 82 L.Ed 850 (1938).
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In the wake of the Swamp Land Grants, considerable litigation re-
sulted over the issue of whether alleged sovereignty lands were included
within transfers to the state of swamp and overflowed lands. In McDade
v. Bossier Levee Board," the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed that
even permanently overflowed swamps, or shallow lakes, were included
within the Swam,) Land Grants. In Chauvin v. Louisiana Oyster Com-
mission," the Louisiana Oyster Commission sought to have declared as
null transfers of land donated to Louisiana under the Swamp Land Grants
and sold by the slate in 1876 alleging that the land in question had been
acquired by Louifiana as sovereignty land, the alienation of which had
not been authorized by the legislature. The Louisiana Supreme Court
characterized the Oyster Commission's claim as "novel" in view of the
fact that "for more than half a century the United States and State of Lou-
isiana have acquiesced in the title so conveyed."" The Court then found
that the Oyster Commission cannot collaterally attack the title derived by
the plaintiffs from the state and that acceptance by the state of lands cer-
tified to it by the Secretary of Interior as swamp and overflowed land is
conclusive upon :he state as to the title to and character of such lands.
The Court declared that the state is estopped to deny that the tract in dis-
pute is swamp and overflowed land and decreed evidence to the contrary
to be inadmissible. While the holding in Chauvin appeared to be defini-
tive, decisions in cases which followed Chauvin seem to blur the results
in Chauvin.
In Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission of Louisiana,"
the Oyster Commission alleged state ownership of certain submerged
lands in St. Bernard Parish. The Court concluded that the private claim-
ant, to the extent that he asserts title to lands bordering on or surrounded
by the Gulf, cannot sustain his title below the high-water mark and that
he may not claim title to navigable streams and channels." Similarly, in
State v. Capdeville," the Court declared that beds of navigable streams
and lakes and lands underlying the tidal waters of the sea were not con-
veyed to the state by virtue of the Swamp Land Grants because the prop-
erty never belonged to the United States; but rather, those lands consti-
tute property reserved to the state by virtue of inherent sovereignty."
5 109 La. 625, 33 So. 628 (La. 1902).
s4 1 La. 10, 46 So 38 (1908).
ss 121 La. at 14.
56 125 La. 740, 51 So. 706 (1910).
5 51 So. at 755.
s8 146 La. 94, 83 3o. 421 (La. 1919), cert. denied 246 U.S. 581, 40 S.Ct. 346, 64 L.Ed
727.
5 146 La. at 106.
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To the contrary, in State v. Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co.,6 the
Court concluded that there was no merit in the state's contention that the
bottom of a dried lake allegedly subject to the ebb and flow of the tide
was not included in the Swamp Land Grants. The Court found that the
legislature, in providing for the sale of "sea marsh, subject to tidal over-
flow," acknowledged that such lands are included in the Swamp Land
Grants and, therefore, are susceptible to transfers to the private sector.'
The Court in Sweet Lake apparently distinguishes Capdeville by suggest-
ing that those "tide waters of the sea" which are excluded from the
Swamp Land Grants are those falling within the definition of seashore in
Article 451 of the Civil Code.'
The foregoing jurisprudence appears consistent in two significant
respects. First, the beds and bottoms of navigable waters, the sea and its
shores, as defined by Louisiana law, are sovereignty lands acquired by
Louisiana upon admission and not by virtue of the Swamp Land Grants.
Second, to the extent Louisiana designated lands as being acquired pur-
suant to the Swamp Land Grants, the designation of these lands as
swamp and overflowed land is not subject to challenge, except. to the ex-
tent the lands constitute the beds and bottoms of navigable waters, the
sea or seashore as defined by the Civil Code as of the date of Louisiana's
admission to the Union. Such an interpretation is also consistent with the
legislature's declarations in R.S. 9:1115.1 et seq.
VIII. Issues Related to Land Loss and Restoration
The fact of coastal land loss due to multiple factors, including ero-
sion, subsidence and sea level rise, is well known and well documented.
The deterioration has occurred with respect to both the coastline and in-
ternal marshes. The United States Geological Survey, based on a com-
parison of satellite photography taken in October 2004 to photographs
taken in October 2005, has estimated that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
transformed 217 square miles of Louisiana coastal marsh into open wa-
ter. How much of that loss is permanent is still unknown. The effect of
coastal land loss on titles is also uncertain. The resolution of issues relat-
ing to the impacts of coastal erosion on title will be significant in a num-
ber of respects, not the least of which will be the ownership of substan-
tially valuable mineral rights in coastal Louisiana.
In the context of.state lease sales, we are already witnessing signifi-
cantly increased claims by the state both along the shore and in the inte-
rior marshes as a result of coastal land loss and interior marsh deteriora-
tion. In most instances, lessees are obtaining dual leases. In virtually
every instance in which a dual lease is drilled and made productive, a
-44 -
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concursus proceeding results. As erosion continues, and state claims of
ownership to traditionally private land increases, the economic viability
of drilling prospects will become more questionable as the costs of ac-
quiring protective leases from both the state and the private claimant in-
creases. Revised procedures adopted by the State Mineral Board are ex-
acerbating issues related to the identification of state private claims. In
past years, state claimed waterbottoms were cross-hatched on tract maps
for identification ,urposes. That practice has been teiminated. Presently,
tract maps carry :io identification of the state claimed waterbottms but
only an estimate c f the number of acres of waterbottoms within the limits
of the tract. Accordingly, we have seen situations in which the state pur-
ports to lease an estimated 1,000 acres of waterbottoms within a tract
consisting of more than 7,000 acres with no identification as to the loca-
tion of the state claimed waterbottoms. In the view of many, the current
practice will increase the cost of lease acquisitions and chill oil and gas
development in areas in which the state claims are significant.
* For the most part, the laws under which we operate today were not
designed to address the myriad of issues resulting from the land loss we
are currently experiencing. As a result, there has been an emergence of
statutes designed to address specific problems associated with the land
loss and efforts to restore the coast.
One examplc of a statute which has been adopted to address coastal
land loss issues ih R.S. 9:1151, familiarly referred to as the "freeze stat-
ute." In pertinent part, that statute provides when ownership of lands or
waterbottoms changes as a result of the action of a "navigable stream,
bay, lake, sea, or arm of the sea" the new owner, including the state, shall
take the same subject to and encumbered with "any oil, gas, or mineral
lease covering an i affecting such lands or water bottoms, and subject to
the mineral and royalty rights of the lessors in such lease, their heirs,
successors, and as signs."
The essence Df the freeze statute is to establish that rights of mineral
lessees and royalty owners shall not be affected by changes in ownership
as a result of dereliction, erosion, subsidence or other action of the water
body." By its express terms, it is the existence of a mineral lease which
determines the applicability of the freeze statute, not the presence of oil
and gas production.
In determining if the freeze statute is applicable, it should be kept in
mind that the statute was amended in 2001. Acts 2001, No. 963, §1. Prior
63 See Cities Serv.ce Oil and Gas Corporation v. State, 574 So.2d 455 (La.App. 2nd
Cir. 1991), writ denied, 578 So.2d 132, writ denied, 578 So.2d 134, reconsideration de-
nied, 578 So.2d 663, writ denied, 578 So.2d 136, writ denied, 578 So.2d 137, certorari
denied, 112 S.Ct. 18f, 502 U.S. 563, 116 L.Ed.2d 147 (1991); Plaquemines Parish Gov-
ernment v. State, 826 So.2d 14 (La.App. 4th Cir. 2002), writ denied, 824 So.2d 1170 (La.
2002).
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to 2001, the statute provided that it was applicable to changes in owner-
ship resulting from "the action of a navigable stream, bay or lake." The
2001 amendment added the words "sea, or arm of the sea." That act also
expressly added the words "erosion" and "subsidence" to the non-
exclusive list of actions that implicated the statute. To date, there has not
been a judicial determination as to whether the 2001 revision was sub-
stantive or a mere clarification of the prior statute.
The legislature has also adopted statutes to address both reclamation
of eroded lands by the riparian owner and efforts by the state to restore
coastal land loss. For example, by Act 633 of 2004, the legislature pro-
vided the Department of Natural Resources with authority to expropriate
property rights needed for "barrier island preservation and restoration, or
creation for coastal wetland purposes."' The filing of a petition for ex-
propriation constitutes the agreement of the state to establish in the
owner of the property condemned the perpetual, transferable ownership
of all subsurface mineral rights to the then-existing coast or shoreline of
the property acquired." The mineral rights created in favor of the former
owner of the condemned land are neither subject to the prescription of
non-use nor subject to the loss as a result of future changes in the coast
or shoreline, whether such changes result from natural or artificial
causes. In addition, the filing of the petition of expropriation constitutes
the agreement to transfer to the owner of the property an undivided 50%
of the mineral rights in and to the emergent land, i.e. land created as a
result of the restoration project. The mineral rights created in the emer-
gent land are not subject to the prescription of non-use; however, those
mineral rights may be lost in the event the emergent land is subsequently
lost. The mineral rights created under these statutes in favor of the owner
of the property condemned are expressly made subject to the provisions
of R.S. 41:1702 and R.S. 9:1151 (the freeze statute)."
R.S. 41:1702 is familiarly known as the reclamation statute. It was
initially adopted by Act 645 of 1978. It was subsequently amended in
1996, 2001, 2004 and 2006 to address the ever changing faces of both
land loss and efforts to restore that loss. In addition to giving the riparian
owner the authority to reclaim, subject to permits issued by the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources, land lost through erosion, compaction, subsi-
dence, or sea level rise occurring on and after July 1, 1921, it attempts to
facilitate state acquisition of lands and rights necessary to conduct
coastal conservation and restoration projects by authorizing agreements
between the state and the riparian owner by which the riparian owner is
granted certain mineral rights in exchange for the land rights required for
64 R.S. 49:214.61.
65 R.S. 49:214.62.
66 R.S. 49:214.62(E).
- 46 -
18
Annual Institute on Mineral Law, Vol. 54 [2007], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol54/iss1/6
the restoration project.
In these circtmstances, the Department of Natural Resources is au-
thorized to enter into agreements which will provide to the riparian
owner a perpetual: transferable ownership of subsurface mineral rights to
the then-existing ,;horeline and which may also provide for a limited or
perpetual transfer, in whole or in part, of subsurface mineral rights relat-
ing to the emergent land." In essence, the reclamation statute extends to
the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resourcet the authority to
negotiate with the riparian owner for the rights necessary to implement
coastal restoration and conservation projects by creating unique mineral
rights. The minerg I rights authorized by the reclamation statute as to the
existing shoreline, being perpetual and transferable, are fixed forever,
and are not diminished by future erosion of the shoreline or by the pre-
scription of non-use. On the other hand, mineral rights created in the
emergent land will generally be lost if the emergent land subsequently
erodes.
11X. Conclusion
Many waterb Attom title issues involve legal concepts that have been
with us since the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory by the United
States. Others are the result of Louisiana's changing coastal environ-
ment. In either situation, the issues are often complex and are almost cer-
tain to be fact sensitive. If this presentation has resulted in a greater
awareness of the issues, then it has served its purpose. These issues are
likely to become neither less numerous nor less complex in the future.
Hopefully, these materials will assist those facing these issues in their
analysis and resolution of same.
67 R.S. 41:1702(2)(a)(i).
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